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Constitutional environmental law has become a recognized and
institutionalized specialty within environmental law, an acknowledgement of
the pervasive interactions between the U.S. Constitution and the federal
environmental statutes that go well beyond the normal constitutional
underpinnings of federal administrative law. This Article posits that
constitutional environmental law is the result of Congress consciously
deciding that environmental protection is everybody’s business—specifically,
from Congress’s decisions that states should participate in rather than be
preempted by federal environmental law, that private citizens and
organizations should help to enforce the statutes, and that private land and
water rights are necessary components of national environmental protection.
Nevertheless, despite almost five decades of constitutional environmental
litigation and scholarship, the federal courts had never recognized
environmental rights within the U.S. Constitution until 2016, raising the
possibility that constitutional environmental law may soon assume another
dimension.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Somewhere in the early 2000s, constitutional environmental law became a
thing—a recognized sub-specialty of environmental law practice and scholarship.
The institutional signals of this fact are strong. The American Bar Association’s
(ABA) Section on Environment, Energy, and Resources (SEER) has included a
committee on Constitutional Law1 since 2005.2 The Constitutional Accountability
Center considers environmental justice to be a core focal area.3 For the last thirteen
years, the Environmental Law Institute in Washington, D.C., through the support of
Beveridge & Diamond, P.C., has sponsored an annual law student writing
competition on constitutional environmental law.4 Law schools advertise
specializations in constitutional environmental law, 5 and there are textbooks on
constitutional environmental law.6 And, of course, there is constitutional
environmental law scholarship—lots of it, including domestic7 and comparative8
legal analyses as well as work in and about other countries. 9
1 Constitutional Law Committee, AM. BAR. ASS’N., https://perma.cc/M982-LJ7A (last visited July
13, 2019).
2 Author’s personal recollection, confirmed through communication with Professor James R. May,
who petitioned SEER to create the committee.
3 Environmental Justice, CONST. ACCOUNTABILITY CTR., https://perma.cc/Q54N-U9Z6 (last
visited July 13, 2019).
4 ELI Constitutional
Environmental Law Writing Competition, ENVTL. L. INST.,
https://perma.cc/Z69R-WAEG (last visited July 13, 2019).
5 See, e.g., Jim May, Constitutional Environmental Law, WIDENER ENVTL. L. CTR.,
https://perma.cc/R7ND-V5DY (last visited July 13, 2019) (providing examples of some institutions that
offer certificates in environmental law).
6 See, e.g., JAMES R. MAY, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1 (2011).
7 Bill Funk, of course, has been a contributor to this scholarship, including: William Funk,
Constitutional Implications of Regional CO2 Cap-and-Trade Programs: The Northeast Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative as a Case in Point, 27 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 353, 354 (2009)
[hereinafter Constitutional Implications of Regional CO2] (discussing environmental constitutional law
issues pertaining to the regional northeast cap-and-trade program); William Funk, Justice Breyer and
Environmental Law, 8 ADMIN. L. REV. AM. U. 735, 735–36 (1995) (discussing Justice Breyer’s views
on environmental law under the U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisdiction); William Funk, Reading Dolan v.
City of Tigard, 25 ENVTL. L. 127, 127 (1995) (discussing a case involving a regional city plan to
develop a green area and bike path using the power of eminent domain); William Funk, Revolution or
Restatement? Awaiting Answers to Lucas’ Unanswered Questions, 23 ENVTL. L. 891, 891 (1993)
(discussing the potential impact of a U.S. case on environmental law in the United States); William
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Constitutional environmental law in many respects signals that environmental
law is a different kind of federal regulatory law. Complexity is probably not the
explanation. While environmental law can certainly be complicated, there are a
number of other fairly complicated areas of federal statutory and regulatory law
where the Constitution plays a fairly minimal role, especially outside the realm of
enforcement and occasional preemption issues; drug safety regulation through the
United States Food and Drug Administration and securities law under the Securities
and Exchange Commission immediately suggest themselves. Notably, no other area
of federal regulatory law appears to have an established subspecialty to address the
constitutional issues that it raises. So, why has this subspecialty arisen for
environmental law?
This Article argues that one of the key differences between federal
environmental law and other areas of federal regulatory law is that federal
environmental law effectively makes environmental protection everybody’s
business.10 Federal environmental statutes establish a suite of relationships between
and among federal agencies, federal courts, state agencies, state courts, regulated
entities, property owners, and general citizens, creating new issues of constitutional
boundaries while at the same time incorporating all the constitutional issues that
arise when citizens and regulated entities interact with federal agencies within
classic administrative law procedures—rulemaking, licensing, and adjudication or
enforcement.
While the list of environmental law relationships is somewhat long,
constitutional environmental law, as distinct from the routine constitutional aspects
of administrative law, tends to emerge from three specific features of the federal
statutes, which in turn provide the structuring of this Article. Part II explores the
constitutional consequences of cooperative federalism, Congress’s deliberate
decision to not only allow but actively encourage state involvement in
implementing federal environmental requirements. As a result, federal
environmental law has raised significant issues regarding the balance between
Congress’s Commerce Clause authority and states’ Tenth Amendment rights,
federal preemption, federal sovereign immunity from state regulation, the dormant
Commerce Clause, and the Compact Clause. Part III, in turn, examines
environmental citizen suits, Congress’s expansion of civil rights causes of action to
allow individual citizens and private organizations help to enforce environmental

Funk, Federal and State Superfunds: Cooperative Federalism or Federal Preemption, 16 ENVTL. L. 1,
1–3 (1985) (discussing state and federal statutes that impact and address environmental justice). Other
scholarly contributions are cited throughout this Article.
8 E.g., Roderic O’Gorman, Environmental Constitutionalism: A Comparative Study, 6
TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 435, 435–62 (2017) (discussing the phenomena of environmental laws being
built into constitutions across the world).
9 E.g., Carl Bruch et al., Constitutional Environmental Law: Giving Force to Fundamental
Principles in Africa, 26 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 131, 132–33 (2001) (considering ways in which
constitutional provisions in African countries may be used to further environmental law).
10 In many ways, this Article is the next step in my own constitutional environmental law
scholarship and is indebted to both my 2004 (first edition) and 2009 (second edition) book, The Clean
Water Act and the Constitution: Legal Structure and the Public’s Rights to a Clean and Healthy
Environment (Environmental Law Institute Press) and the many articles on constitutional environmental
law that I have written both before and after that book.
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law requirements, creating a separate set of constitutional boundary issues. When
citizens can bring enforcement actions in federal courts, they raise issues of states’
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, federal sovereign immunity, and, above
all, constitutional standing. Finally, environmental enforcement by governments
against private entities not only raises classic constitutional issues common to all
federal administrative enforcement, such as the Fourth Amendment’s protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures and the Seventh Amendment’s right to a
jury trial, but also directly influences use of private property, creating recurring
issues of constitutional takings. Part IV explores takings jurisprudence as it has
played out across environmental statutes.
As these Parts together make clear, federal environmental law practitioners
and scholars must be well-versed in a wide range of constitutional law doctrines.
The resulting weaving of statutory and constitutional legal issues created the
tapestry now recognized as constitutional environmental law. This sub-discipline,
moreover, stands poised to expand once again, as environmental plaintiffs once
again are trying to convince the federal courts to recognize a fundamental right to a
functional environment within the U.S. Constitution. 11
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL MESSINESS OF COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM
The United States protects its environment through a fairly comprehensive
array of federal legislation—the National Environmental Policy Act of 196912
(NEPA), the Clean Air Act13 (CAA), the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
better known as the Clean Water Act14 (CWA), the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act of 197615 (RCRA), which amended the Solid Waste Disposal Act,
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
198016 (CERCLA), and many others. As a constitutional matter, it would have been
fairly easy for Congress to expressly preempt state law, completely taking over
these areas of environmental regulation.
As constitutional issues go, express preemption under the Supremacy Clause 17
is a fairly easy analysis. Indeed, on the occasions when Congress has expressly
preempted some aspect of state environmental regulation, the federal courts have
generally had no problem displacing state law. For example, CERCLA expressly
preempts state statutes of limitation—but not statutes of repose18—in favor of a

11 See generally Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1271–72 (D. Or. 2016) (discussed
at the end of this Article).
12 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370h (2012).
13 Id. §§ 7401–7671q.
14 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1388 (2012).
15 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k (2012) (amending Solid Waste Disposal Act, Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79
Stat. 992 (1965)).
16 Id. §§ 9601–9675.
17 The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution states that “[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of
the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.” U.S.
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
18 CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1, 17–18 (2014).
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federal discovery rule.19 The CWA expressly preempts state regulation of marine
sanitation devices.20 Many of the federal environmental statutes expressly preempt
states from imposing environmental requirements that would be less stringent than
federal law.21 Perhaps most contentious has been the preemption provision in the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 22 (FIFRA), which expressly
preempts state labeling or packaging requirements for pesticides, 23 because it
creates a fairly complex relationship between federal regulatory law and state tort
law.24
For the most part, however, Congress has chosen not to expressly preempt
state regulation through its environmental statutes. Instead, it created structures of
cooperative federalism.25 These statutory provisions define specific regulatory roles
that Congress preferred states to play—setting water quality standards26 and issuing
permits27 under the CWA, devising implementation plans to meet National
Ambient Air Quality Standards under the CAA, 28 management of non-hazardous
solid waste under RCRA,29 coastal zone management under the Coastal Zone
Management Act of 1972,30 and many others. Sharing regulatory authority with the
states, it turns out, is a whole lot messier, constitutionally, than express federal
preemption.31 This Part explores five of the constitutional federalism issues that
19

42 U.S.C. § 9658(a)(2) (2012).
33 U.S.C. § 1322(f)(1)(A), (n)(6)(A) (2012).
21 E.g., id. § 1370 (containing the CWA’s statement that a “[s]tate or political subdivision or
interstate agency may not adopt or enforce any effluent limitation, or other limitation, effluent standard,
prohibition, pretreatment standard, or standard of performance which is less stringent that the effluent
limitation, or other limitation, effluent standard, prohibition, pretreatment standard, or standard of
performance under this chapter”).
22 7 U.S.C. §§ 136–136y (2012).
23 Id. § 136v(b).
24 Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 442–53 (2005) (holding that FIFRA did not
preempt state-law tort claims for defective design, defective manufacture, negligent testing, breach of
express warranty, and violation of Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA), but that it might
preempt state-law fraud and failure-to-warn claims); Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597,
606–10 (1991) (holding that FIFRA does not preempt local governmental regulation of pesticide use).
25 E.g., California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 650 (1978) (characterizing the Reclamation Act
of 1902 as a cooperative federalism statute); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n,
(VSMRA) 452 U.S. 264, 288–89 (1981) (characterizing the Surface Mining Control & Reclamation Act
(SMCRA) as a cooperative federalism statute); Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456
U.S. 742, 767 (1982) (characterizing the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act as a cooperative
federalism statute); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167–68 (1992) (listing the CWA,
Occupational Safety and Health Act, RCRA, and the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act
as cooperative federalism statutes) (citations omitted); Envtl. Prot. Agency v. EME Homer City
Generation, L.P., 572 U.S. 489, 510–11, 537 (2014) (describing the CAA as a cooperative federalism
statute).
26 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c), (d) (2012).
27 Id. §§ 1342(b), 1344(d).
28 42 U.S.C. § 7402(a) (2012).
29 Id. §§ 6941–6949a.
30 16 U.S.C. § 1454 (2012).
31 Environmental federalism has prompted significant amounts of scholarship—over 1,000 articles,
according to Westlaw. For representative examples, see generally Erin Ryan, FEDERALISM AND THE
TUG OF WAR WITHIN (2012); Erin Ryan, The Spending Power and Environmental Law After Sebellius,
85 U. COLO. L. REV. 1003 (2014); Brigham Daniels, Environmental Regulatory Nukes, 2013 UTAH L.
REV. 1505 (2013); Robin Kundis Craig, Federalism Challenges to CERCLA: An Overview, 41 SW. L.
20
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environmental cooperative federalism has raised: the balance between the
Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment; the tension between implied
preemption and savings clauses with respect to the continued operation of state
common law; federal sovereign immunity from state permitting and enforcement;
the dormant Commerce Clause; and the Compact Clause.
A. The Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment
As the United States Supreme Court itself has noted, “the task of ascertaining
the constitutional line between federal and state power has given rise to many of
the Court’s most difficult and celebrated cases.”32 The Commerce Clause and the
Tenth Amendment undergird much federalism litigation and have interacted
frequently with federal environmental statutes.33
The Commerce Clause states that “Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes.”34 The Framers intended the Commerce Clause to promote free
trade among the states and thus render the United States a single commercial entity,
but it also provides most of Congress’s authority to enact environmental statutes.
Commerce Clause jurisprudence seeks to strike a balance between the states’
“reasonable exercise of [their] police powers over local affairs” and “matters of
local concern” and the federal government’s power to oversee matters of “national
interest[].”35 Thus, federal power over interstate commerce “‘may not be extended
so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to
embrace them, in view of our complex society, would effectually obliterate the

REV. 617 (2012); Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse
Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719 (2006); Jonathan H. Adler,
Judicial Federalism and the Future of Environmental Regulation, 90 IOWA L. REV. 377 (2005); Dean B.
Suagee, Tribal Self-Determination and Environmental Federalism: Cultural Values as a Force for
Sustainability, 3 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 229 (1998); Robert H. Abrams, Superfund and the Evolution of
Brownfields, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 265 (1997); Robert V. Percival, Environmental
Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141 (1995).
32 New York, 505 U.S. 144, 155 (1992).
33 For discussions of the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment and their relation to
environmental law, see generally David M. Metres, Note, The National Impact Test: Applying
Principled Commerce Clause Analysis to Federal Environmental Regulation, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1035
(2010); Jennifer A. Maier, Comment, Outgrowing the Commerce Clause: Finding Endangered Species
a Home in the Constitutional Framework, 36 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 489 (2006); Mollie Lee, Note,
Environmental Economics: A Market Failure Approach to the Commerce Clause, 116 YALE L.J. 456
(2006); Christine A. Klein, The Environmental Commerce Clause, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2003);
Jamie Y. Tanabe, The Commerce Clause Pendulum: Will Federal Environmental Law Survive in the
Post-SWANCC Epoch of “New Federalism”?, 31 ENVTL. L. 1051 (2001); Charles Tiefer, After
Morrison, Can Congress Preserve Environmental Laws From Commerce Clause Challenges?, 30 Envtl.
L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,888 (2000); Lydia B. Hoover, The Commerce Clause, Federalism and
Environmentalism: At Odds After Olin?, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 735 (1997); Peter
A. Lauricella, The Real “Contract with America”: The Original Intent of the Tenth Amendment and the
Commerce Clause, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1377 (1997); John P. Dwyer, The Commerce Clause and the Limits
of Congressional Authority to Regulate the Environment, 25 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,421
(1995).
34 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
35 Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 370–71 (1976).
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distinction between what is national and what is local and create a completely
centralized government.’”36
Balancing the Commerce Clause is the Tenth Amendment, which provides
that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.”37 The Tenth Amendment functions as the outer boundary of federal power
and hence immediately raises questions of how far federal Commerce Clause
authority can extend. The U.S. Supreme Court emphasized the close relationship
between these two provisions in New York v. United States,38 noting that the
Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment analyses
are mirror images of each other. If a power is delegated to Congress in the
Constitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation of that power
to the States; if a power is an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth
Amendment, it is necessarily a power the Constitution has not conferred on
Congress.39

Nevertheless, the relationship between these two constitutional provisions has
evolved over time. Until 1937, Congress’ Commerce Clause authority was limited
to regulating activities that directly affected interstate commerce.40 In 1937,
however, the U.S. Supreme Court began to accord the federal government much
broader regulatory authority in decisions such as National Labor Relations Board
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. As the Court emphasized in that case, “[t]he
congressional authority to protect interstate commerce from burdens and
obstructions . . . is plenary and may be exerted to protect interstate commerce ‘no
matter what the source of the dangers which threaten it.’” 41 Thus, according to the
Jones & Laughlin Steel Court, Congress possessed expansive powers to regulate
not only interstate commerce itself but also intrastate activities that affect interstate
commerce.42
This understanding of the Commerce Clause provided the constitutional law
foundation for Congress when it began to enact the federal environmental statutes
in the late 1960s. Congress had broad Commerce Clause authority, and if Congress
wanted to induce state participation in federal regulatory programs, Congress could
“‘attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds’” or “offer States the choice of
regulating [an] activity according to federal standards or having state law preempted by federal regulation,” but it could not “simply ‘commandee[r] the

36 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995) (quoting Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)).
37 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
38 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
39 Id. at 156.
40 See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 550 (1935) (striking
down statutes regulating allowable hours and wages because those issues were too remotely related to
interstate commerce).
41 Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 36–37 (quoting Mandou v. New York, New Haven, &
Hartford R.R. Co. (Second Employers’ Liability Cases), 223 U.S. 1, 51 (1912)).
42 Id. at 37.
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legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce
a federal regulatory program.’”43
Congress stayed well within these constitutional boundaries in the federal
environmental statutes. For example, in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and
Reclamation Ass’n (VSMRA), the Supreme Court upheld the federal Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 197744 (SMCRA) against allegations that it
unconstitutionally intruded upon state regulatory authority. 45 Notably, Congress
had explicitly found that surface mining operations affected interstate commerce,
by destroying or diminishing the utility of land for commercial, industrial, residential,
recreational, agricultural, and forestry purposes, by causing erosion and landslides, by
contributing to floods, by polluting the water, by destroying fish and wildlife habitats,
by impairing natural beauty, by damaging the property of citizens, by creating hazards
dangerous to life and property by degrading the quality of life in local communities,
and by counteracting governmental programs and efforts to conserve soil, water, and
other natural resources.46

Moreover, “coal is a commodity that moves in interstate commerce,” and
“nationwide ‘surface mining and reclamation standards are essential in order to
insure that competition in interstate commerce among sellers of coal produced in
different States will not be used to undermine the ability of the several States to
improve and maintain adequate standards on coal mining operations within their
borders.’”47 As a result, the SMCRA was constitutional. 48
In California Coastal Commission v. Granite Rock Co.,49 the U.S. Supreme
Court specifically distinguished environmental regulation from land use planning
with respect to the Commerce Clause/Tenth Amendment balance, concluding that
“[l]and use planning in essence chooses particular uses for the land; environmental
regulation, at its core, does not mandate particular uses of the land but requires only
that, however the land is used, damage to the environment is kept within prescribed
limits.”50 While land use planning is presumptively a state prerogative,
environmental regulation clearly could be the subject of federal statute,51 and the
VSMRA Court “agree[d] with the lower federal courts that have uniformly found
the power conferred by the Commerce Clause broad enough to permit
congressional regulation of activities causing air or water pollution . . . .”52
For a time, therefore, the Commerce Clause/Tenth Amendment limitations on
federal environmental law were functionally insignificant. However, in 1995, the

43 New York, 505 U.S. 144, 161,167 (1992) (quoting South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206
(1987); VSMRA, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)).
44 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1279 (2012).
45 VSMRA, 452 U.S. at 291.
46 Id. at 277 (quoting 30 U.S.C. § 1201(c)).
47 Id. at 281–82 (quoting 30 U.S.C. §1201(g)).
48 Id. at 268.
49 480 U.S. 572 (1987).
50 Id. at 587.
51 See id. at 588.
52 VSMRA, 452 U.S. at 282.
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U.S. Supreme Court decided United States v. Lopez,53 revitalizing Commerce
Clause challenges to the federal environmental statutes. In that case, the Court
invalidated, on Commerce Clause grounds, the Gun Free School Zones Act of
1990,54 in the process “identif[ying] three broad categories of activity that Congress
may regulate under its commerce power.” 55 “First, Congress may regulate the use
of the channels of interstate commerce.”56 “Second, Congress is empowered to
regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons and
things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from
intrastate activities.”57 “Finally, Congress’ commerce authority includes the power
to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce.” 58
Lopez inspired new constitutional challenges to many federal environmental
statutes, especially those statutes, like the Endangered Species Act (ESA) 59 and
53 514 U.S. 549 (1995). The Lopez decision inspired much commentary. Some of the discussions
regarding its federalism implications include: Eric R. Claeys, The Living Commerce Clause: Federalism
in Progressive Political Theory and the Commerce Clause After Lopez and Morrison, 11 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 403 (2002); Bill Swinford & Eric N. Waltenburg, The Supreme Court and the States: Do
Lopez and Printz Represent a Broader Pro-State Movement?, 14 J.L. & POL. 319 (1998); Julian Epstein,
Evolving Spheres of Federalism After U.S. v. Lopez and Other Cases, 34 HARV. J. LEGIS. 525 (1997);
Russell F. Pannier, Lopez and Federalism, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 71 (1996); Ann Althouse,
Enforcing Federalism After United States v. Lopez, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 793 (1996); Debbie Ellis, A Lopez
Legacy?: The Federalism Debate Renewed, But Not Resolved, 17 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 85 (1996); Rachel
Elizabeth Smith, Note, United States v. Lopez: Reaffirming the Federal Commerce Power and
Remembering Federalism, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 1459 (1996); Michael J. Trapp, Note, A Small Step
Towards Restoring the Balance of Federalism: A Limit to Federal Power Under the Commerce Clause
United States v. Lopez, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 1471 (1996); Gregory W. O’Reilly & Robert Drizin, United
States v. Lopez: Reinvigorating the Federal Balance by Maintaining the States’ Role as the “Immediate
and Visible Guardians” of Security, 22 J. LEGIS. 1 (1996); Eric W. Hagen, Note, United States v. Lopez:
Artificial Respiration for the Tenth Amendment, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 1363 (1996); Anthony B. Ching,
Travelling Down the Unsteady Path: United States v. Lopez, New York v. United States, and the Tenth
Amendment, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 99 (1995).
54 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (Supp. II 1994).
55 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 558–59.
59 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2012). See People for the Ethical Treatment of Prop. Owners v. U.S.
Fish & Wildlife Serv., 852 F.3d 990, 1000–06 (10th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 649 (2018);
Markle Interests v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 827 F.3d 452, 475–78 (5th Cir. 2016), cert. granted and
vacated on other grounds, 139 S. Ct. 590 (2018); San Luis & Delta–Mendota Water Auth. v. Salazar,
638 F.3d 1163, 1174–77 (9th Cir. 2011); Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coal. v. Kempthorne, 477 F.3d
1250, 1271–77 (11th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1097 (2008); Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323
F.3d 1062, 1064–76 (D.C. Cir. 2003); GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 636–41 (5th Cir.
2003); Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 490–99 (4th Cir. 2000); Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt,
130 F.3d 1041, 1046–57 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Shields v. Babbitt, 229 F. Supp. 2d 638, 659–64 (W.D. Tex.
2000), vacated sub nom. Shields v. Norton, 289 F.3d 832 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied sub nom. Schuele
v. Norton, 537 U.S. 1071 (2002); Bldg. Indus. Ass’n of Superior Cal. v. Babbitt, 979 F. Supp. 893, 906–
08 (D.D.C. 1997) (all except Shields v. Babbitt upholding the ESA against post-Lopez Commerce Clause
challenges); see also Christopher S. Turner, Gibbs v. Babbitt: The Vitality of Endangered Species
Protection in the Lopez Era, 15 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 301, 301, 303 (2000–2001) (analyzing
application of Lopez to ESA cases); Rob Strang, Note, Gibbs v. Babbitt: The Taking of Red Wolves on
Private Land, A Post-Lopez Challenge to the Endangered Species Act, 14 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 229, 241
(2000) (using post-Lopez cases to argue that Lopez gives the courts latitude to uphold regulation of
activities that may not normally be considered interstate commerce); Gavin R. Villareal, Note, One Leg
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CERCLA,60 that can interfere with commercial development and land use. Nor
have these challenges completely abated, and courts continue to debate whether and
how the Commerce Clause limits the scope of federal environmental law,
generating more constitutional environmental law in the process.61 Perhaps the
longest-running controversy that can be directly traced to Lopez is the scope of the
CWA’s “waters of the United States” 62 and, hence, the scope of federal jurisdiction
under the Act. In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers,63 the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit squarely
teed up the post-Lopez Commerce Clause issue with respect to the CWA’s
application to isolated waters used by migratory birds, finding Commerce Clause
support for such jurisdiction. 64 Although the U.S. Supreme Court decided its review
on statutory, not constitutional, grounds, it refused to accord the Corps’
interpretation of “waters of the United States” Chevron deference because that
interpretation threatened to violate the Commerce Clause and undermine the
demands of federalism.65 According to the Court, the Migratory Bird Rule raised
“significant constitutional questions,” because “[p]ermitting respondents to claim
federal jurisdiction over ponds and mudflats falling within the ‘Migratory Bird
Rule’ would result in a significant impingement of the States’ traditional and
primary power over land and water use.”66 Almost twenty years later, a
constitutional cloud still hovers over the CWA, although the “waters of the United
States” debate has taken on a legal life of its own, spurred by the Court’s fractured
2006 decision in Rapanos v. United States,67 two controversial rulemakings,68 and a
fairly dramatic change in presidential administration in 2017.
Few constitutional environmental law scholars doubt that Congress could
successfully establish and clarify its Commerce Clause authority over the
constitutionally gray environmental regulatory issues remaining after Lopez. The
question instead is whether it has. Lopez and its progeny create an expectation that
Congress will justify its authority to enact statutes, and thus far Congress has
generally been unwilling to amend the classic federal environmental statutes to
make their constitutional grounding clearer. The absence of this key player in
federal environmental law underscores the importance of a continuing dialogue

to Stand On: The Treaty Power and Congressional Authority for the Endangered Species Act After
United States v. Lopez, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1125, 1127 (1998) (arguing that the Commerce Clause does not
give Congress the authority to support legislation as broad as the ESA).
60 Voggenthaler v. Md. Square LLC, 724 F.3d 1050, 1059–61 (9th Cir. 2013); Freier v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 303 F.3d 176, 200–03 (2nd Cir. 2002); United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d
1506, 1509–11 (11th Cir. 1997).
61 See, e.g., Lighthouse Res. Inc. v. Inslee, No. 3:18-cv-05005-RJB, 2018 WL 5264334, at *6–8
(W.D. Wash. 2018) (arguing that the denial of a § 401 certification under the CWA violated the
Commerce Clause).
62 See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2012).
63 191 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 1999).
64 Id. at 850.
65 Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty., 531 U.S. at 172–74 (citing Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v.
Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)).
66 Id. at 174 (citing Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 44 (1994)).
67 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
68 Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37,053 (Jun. 29,
2015); Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 84 Fed. Reg. 4145 (Feb. 14, 2019).
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between the courts and the legislature as constitutional jurisprudence evolves over
time.
B. Implied Preemption, Savings Clauses, and the Common Law
Under the Supremacy Clause, Congress may implicitly preempt state law as
well as expressly preempt it.69 This is the most complex kind of federal preemption
analysis, in part because the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized several different
pathways to implicit preemption, all of which focus upon Congress’s overall
purpose in enacting the federal legislation. For example, “[t]he scheme of federal
regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress
left no room for the States to supplement it,” 70 a type of implicit preemption
generally known as field preemption. For example, the Natural Gas Act of 1938, 71 a
“comprehensive scheme of federal regulation” that gives the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) “exclusive jurisdiction over the transportation and
sale of natural gas in interstate commerce for resale,” embodies a congressional
intent to occupy the field of interstate natural gas regulation because it gives FERC
authority to regulate almost every aspect of natural gas transportation and sale. 72
Courts will also imply a congressional intent to preempt state law if “the Act of
Congress . . . touch[es] a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the
federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same
subject.”73 Finally, courts will find implicit preemption if “the object sought to be
obtained by the federal law and the character of obligations imposed by it . . .
reveal” Congress’s intent to preempt state law. 74
Implicit preemption tends to be rare in federal environmental law, however.
Because Congress intended these statutes to work through cooperative federalism,
many of their preemption-related provisions actually function as “saving clauses”
that preserve states’ rights to regulate. For example, the CWA’s first section
preserves “the authority of each State to allocate quantities of water within its
jurisdiction” and specifies that nothing in the CWA “shall be construed to
supersede or abrogate rights to quantities of water which have been established by
any State.”75 The CWA thus distinguishes between water rights, which remain
under state control, and water quality, which is the CWA’s subject.76 The
69

Ray v. Atl. Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157–58, 167–68 (1978).
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (citing Pa. R.R. Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm’n, 250 U.S. 566, 569 (1919)); Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 156 (1942)); see
also Ray, 435 U.S. at 157.
71 15 U.S.C. §§ 717–717w (2012).
72 See Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 300–04 (1988) (discussing the powers
FERC is given to regulate).
73 Rice, 331 U.S. at 230 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62–63 (1941)); see also Ray, 435
U.S. at 157.
74 Rice, 331 U.S. at 230 (citing S. R.R. Co. v. R.R. Comm’n, 236 U.S. 439, 446 (1915); Charleston
& W.C. R.R. Co. v. Varnville Co., 237 U.S. 597, 601–04 (1915); N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Winfield, 244
U.S. 147, 149, 150, 153 (1917); Napier v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 272 U.S. 605, 611 (1926)); see also
Ray, 435 U.S. at 157–58.
75 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (2012).
76 Id.; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012) (compare the water quality language of subsection (a)
with the water quantity language of subsection (g)).
70
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provisions of environmental statutes that prohibit states from enacting less stringent
regulation also implicitly permit states to enact more stringent regulation than
federal law requires.77 Environmental citizen suit provisions, discussed in more
detail in Part II, almost universally preserve plaintiffs’ state-law causes of action
rather than preempting them. 78
The savings provisions in the federal environmental statutes have allowed
states to create large operating spaces of their own within environmental law. For
example, California prohibits land disposal of biosolids through its Integrated
Waste Management Act, and the United States District Court for the Central
District of California has upheld this ban against claims that the CWA preempts
such prohibitions—although the California Constitution might forbid them. 79 The
savings clauses in environmental citizen suit provisions generally leave state tort
law fully in force to provide redress when pollution or other environmental mishaps
harm persons or property. As one example, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia relied on the CWA’s savings clause to conclude that the
CWA does not preempt state nuisance, trespass, or negligence claims in connection
with the spraying or spreading of sewage sludge on land.80
Nevertheless, not all implied preemption claims in environmental law fail. In
particular, in areas where federal control is clearly dominant—such as is true for
regulation of vessels on the ocean—courts will still preempt state law. Thus, when
the State of Washington attempted to regulate oil tankers more stringently than
federal law requires in an attempt to better protect itself from oil spills, the U.S.
Supreme Court reversed the normal Supremacy Clause presumption of nonpreemption and narrowly construed the savings clauses in both the Ports and
Waterways Safety Act81 and the Oil Pollution Act of 199082 (OPA) in order to
“respect[] the established federal-state balance in matters of maritime commerce
between the subjects as to which the States retain concurrent powers and those over
which the federal authority displaces state control.” 83 Washington was “regulat[ing]
in an area where there has been a history of significant federal presence,” and its
laws were preempted.84
Cooperative federalism and savings clauses, therefore, cannot completely
eliminate the Supremacy Clause’s shadow, prompting new preemption challenges
77

U.S. Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 830 (7th Cir. 1977).
See infra Part II and accompanying discussion. For example, the CWA’s citizen suit provision
emphasizes that “[n]othing . . . shall restrict any right which any person (or class of persons) may have
under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek
other relief (including relief against the Administrator or a State agency).” 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e).
79 City of Los Angeles v. Cty. of Kern, 509 F. Supp. 2d 865, 894 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (holding that
“merely because the Clean Water Act does not preempt local bans on land application [of biosolids]
does not mean that it expressly authorizes them despite state constitutional limitations to the contrary”).
80 Wyatt v. Sussex Surrey L.L.C., 482 F. Supp. 2d 740, 745–46 (E.D. Va. 2007).
81 33 U.S.C. § 1225(a) (2012).
82 Id. § 2718.
83 See United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 106 (2000).
84 Id. at 106, 108. For more in-depth discussions of this case, see Paul S. Weiland, Preemption of
Environmental Law: Is the U.S. Supreme Court Heading in the Wrong Direction?, 30 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,579 (July 2000); see generally R. Brent Walton & Daniel J. Gunter, United States
v. Locke: The Supreme Court Preempts States from Protecting Their Navigable Waters and Marine
Resources From Oil Tanker Spills, 15 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 37 (2000).
78
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to test—successfully or unsuccessfully—the exact contours of the operating spaces
that Congress has left for states. When Congress is not expressly clear about its
intent to preempt—or conversely, its intent to preserve—state law, the U.S.
Constitution thus remains a potential limit on state regulatory authority, promoting
the continual creation of constitutional environmental law in ways that
comprehensive displacement of state regulatory authority would not.
C. Federal Sovereign Immunity and State Regulation of Federal Facilities
According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in its 2009,
and apparently last, report on federal facilities’ environmental compliance,
the U.S. government owns and/or operates more than 42,000,000 acres of land with
922,000 buildings, leases, and structures. Federal land ranges from forests, parks, and
historic monuments to office buildings, hospitals, hydroelectric dams, and prisons.
Operations from all types of federal facilities can generate pollution, create waste and
impact the environment.85

These federal facilities must comply with federal environmental laws, and, “[a]s of
FY08, the EPA and states track[ed] more than 12,000 permits at nearly 11,000
sites, including underground storage tanks, community water systems, and air
emissions sources.”86 For example, under the Emergency Planning and Community
Right to Know Act (EPCRA),87 265 federal facilities must report their releases of
hazardous materials to the Toxics Release Inventory. 88
While the EPA often still takes the lead in enforcing federal environmental
requirements against federal facilities, 89 as states increasingly took over
environmental permitting programs and enforcement authority, federal sovereign
immunity in connection with these facilities became a serious constitutional issue.
Sovereign immunity is a penumbral constitutional right of the United States,
deriving from an English doctrine that “the King could do no wrong.” 90 The federal
courts have always required a plaintiff suing the federal government to demonstrate
that the United States has waived its sovereign immunity and that the plaintiff’s
case falls within that waiver.91 Only Congress can waive U.S. sovereign immunity 92
85 OFFICE OF ENF’T & COMPLIANCE ASSISTANCE, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, THE 2008
STATE OF FEDERAL FACILITIES: AN OVERVIEW OF ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE AT FEDERAL
FACILITIES 5 (2009) [hereinafter 2009 EPA FEDERAL FACILITIES REPORT].
86 Id.; see also Exec. Order No. 12,088, § 1–102, 43 Fed. Reg. 47,707 (Oct. 13, 1978) (requiring all
federal facilities to comply “with applicable pollution control standards,” including those in the Toxic
Substances Control Act, the CWA, the Safe Drinking Water Act, the CAA, the Noise Control Act,
RCRA, and FIFRA).
87 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001–11050 (2012).
88 See 2009 EPA FEDERAL FACILITIES REPORT, supra note 85, at 5.
89 See generally id.; Enforcement at Federal Facilities, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
https://perma.cc/E9KW-U5S4 (last updated July 13, 2018).
90 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 171 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting).
91 See United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941); Price v. United States, 174 U.S. 373,
375–76 (1899) (“It is an axiom of our jurisprudence. The Government is not liable to suit unless it
consents thereto, and its liability in suit cannot be extended beyond the plain language of the statute
authorizing it.”); Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163, 166 (1894); United States v. Clarke, 33 U.S.
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and it must do so unequivocally.93 In addition, “[C]ongress has an absolute
discretion to specify the cases and contingencies in which the liability of the
government is submitted to the courts for judicial determination.”94 As a result, the
federal courts construe any waiver of sovereign immunity strictly and in favor of
the United States.95
Environmental sovereign immunity issues came to a head when states began
to assume permitting authority under various federal statutes and then attempted to
force federal facilities to obtain state permits. In general, the relevant waivers of
sovereign immunity from state permitting requirements must come from the
various environmental statutes’ federal facilities provisions.96 The U.S. Supreme
Court addressed the federal sovereign immunity issue for state permitting in 1976
in two companion cases—Hancock v. Train,97 which dealt with the CAA, and U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency v. California ex rel. State Water Resources
Control Board,98 which dealt with the CWA. In both cases, the Court held that the
relevant Act’s federal facilities provision was not specific enough to subject federal
facilities to state permitting processes.99 However, Congress then amended those
two provisions to make the waiver more explicit.100

436, 444 (1834) (“As the United States are not suable of common right, the party who institutes such
suit must bring his case within the authority of some act of congress, or the court cannot exercise
jurisdiction over it.”); Beamon v. Brown, 125 F.3d 965, 967 (6th Cir. 1997); Preferred Risk Mut. Ins.
Co. v. United States, 86 F.3d 789, 791–92 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1116 (1997); Fostvedt
v. United States, 978 F.2d 1201, 1202–03 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 988 (1993) (quoting
United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976) (quoting Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 586)); McCarty v.
United States, 929 F.2d 1085, 1087 (5th Cir. 1991); Voluntary Purchasing Grps., Inc. v. Reilly, 889 F.2d
1380, 1385 (5th Cir. 1989); see also Robin Kundis Craig, Comment, Of Fish, Federal Dams, and State
Protections: A State’s Options Against the Federal Government for Dam-Related Fish Kills on the
Columbia River, 26 ENVTL. L. 355, 369 (1996) (discussing the basic principles of sovereign immunity);
Kenneth Culp Davis, Sovereign Immunity Must Go, 22 ADMIN. L. REV. 383, 384 (1970) (discussing the
role of the courts in sovereign immunity jurisprudence).
92 Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. Of Univ. & Sch. Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 280 (1983); Dalehite v.
United States, 346 U.S. 15, 30 (1953); Presidential Gardens Assocs. v. United States ex rel. Sec’y of
Hous. & Urban Dev., 175 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Millares Guiraldes de Tineo v. United
States, 137 F.3d 715, 719 (2nd Cir. 1998)); Sprecher v. Graber, 716 F.2d 968, 973 (2nd Cir. 1983).
93 U.S. Dep’t of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 615 (1992) (citing United States v. Mitchell, 445
U.S. 535, 538–39 (1980)); Beamon, 125 F.3d at 967; Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 86 F.3d at 792;
Alaska v. Babbitt, 38 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503
U.S. 30, 34 (1992)); Fostvedt, 978 F.2d at 1203 (citing United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969)).
94 Schillinger, 155 U.S. at 166.
95 Orff v. United States, 545 U.S. 596, 601–02 (2005); U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 503 U.S. at 615
(quoting McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25, 27 (1951)); Block, 461 U.S. at 287; Babbitt, 38 F.3d at
1072 (quoting Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. at 34); Fostvedt, 978 F.2d at 1202 (citing Ruckelshaus v.
Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 685 (1983)); McCarty, 929 F.2d at 1087.
96 E.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (2012); CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7418(a) (2012); RCRA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6961 (2012).
97 426 U.S. 167, 168 (1976).
98 426 U.S. 200, 201–02 (1976).
99 Hancock, 426 U.S. at 198–99; California ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. at 227–
28.
100 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No, 95-95, § 116, 91 Stat. 685, 711 (1977); Clean
Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, §§ 60, 61(a), 91 Stat. 1566, 1597 (1977) (amending 33 U.S.C.
§ 1323).
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The next issue was whether federal facilities could be held liable for stateassessed civil penalties. In 1992, in U.S. Department of Energy v. Ohio, the U.S.
Supreme Court decided this issue in the context of both the CWA and RCRA,
deciding once again that the waivers of sovereign immunity were not broad enough
to subject federal facilities to state-issued (or indeed any) civil penalties. 101
Congress amended RCRA’s federal facilities provision to fix the problem,102 but it
has not amended the CWA’s.
The federal sovereign immunity doctrine thus challenges and, under many
statutes, still limits states’ constitutional ability to become full-fledged
environmental regulators. In particular, because Congress has to be exceptionally—
one might argue excessively—clear in drafting its waivers of federal sovereign
immunity, assertions of state authority pursuant to the most natural readings of
federal facilities provisions can still prompt constitutional challenges to that
authority. Again, therefore, cooperative federalism generates constitutional
environmental law.
D. Dormant Commerce Clause
Because the U.S. Constitution’s Commerce Clause gives authority over
interstate commerce to Congress, it also restricts the states from discriminating in
trade or from enacting protectionist laws—the effects of the so-called dormant
Commerce Clause.103 According to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Interstate
Commerce Clause “has long been understood . . . to provide ‘protection from state
legislation inimical to the national commerce [even] where Congress has not
acted.’”104 In 2008, it emphasized that “[t]he modern law of what has come to be
called the dormant Commerce Clause is driven by concern about ‘economic

101 U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 503 U.S. 607, 621–27 (1992). For more detailed discussions of this
decision, see Mirth White, Can Congress Draft a Statute Which Forces Federal Facilities to Comply
With Environmental Laws in Light of the Holding in United States Department of Energy v. Ohio?, 15
WHITTIER L. REV. 203, 211–15 (1994); Daniel Horne, Note, Federal Facility Environmental
Compliance After United States Department of Energy v. Ohio, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 631, 635–37
(1994); Rebecca Heintz, Note, Federal Sovereign Immunity and Clean Water: A Supreme Misstep, 24
ENVTL. L. 263, 264–65 (1994); Gregory J. May, U.S. Department of Energy v. Ohio and the Federal
Facility Compliance Act of 1992: The Supreme Court Forces a Hazardous Compromise in CWA and
RCRA Enforcement Against Federal Agencies, 4 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 363, 364–65 (1993); Karen M.
Matson, Note, Waiver of Sovereign Immunity—Did Congress Intend to Exempt Federal Facilities From
Civil Penalties Under the Clean Water Act? United States Department of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S. Ct.
1627 (1992), 28 LAND & WATER L. REV. 489, 489–90 (1993); Peter McKenna, States May Not Impose
Civil Penalties on the U.S. Government for Violations of State Statutes Promulgated Under the
Authority of the Clean Water Act and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 23 SETON HALL L.
REV. 762, 775–77 (1993).
102 Federal Facility Compliance Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-386, § 102(a), (b), 106 Stat. 1505,
1505–06 (Oct. 6, 1992) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 6961).
103 See, e.g., Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 956–60 (1982) (groundwater);
Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del., 450 U.S. 662, 669–79 (1981) (trailer requirements for
commercial trucking); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336–38 (1979) (transporting or shipping
minnows) (all striking down state laws that burdened interstate commerce).
104 Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 512 U.S. 298, 310 (1994) (quoting S. Pac. Co.
v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945)).
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protectionism—that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic
interests by burdening out-of-state competitors.’”105
With this principle as the touchstone, dormant Commerce Clause challenges
are evaluated in two steps. First, if state legislation facially discriminates against
interstate commerce, it is “virtually per se invalid.”106 The federal courts will
uphold such a law “only if it ‘advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be
adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.’” 107 Second, if a
state law appears to regulate even-handedly but indirectly affects interstate
commerce, it is evaluated under the Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.108 balancing test.
Under this test:
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public
interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld
unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits . . . If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question
becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of
course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be
promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.109

State laws are almost always constitutional under Pike balancing.110
In environmental law, the dormant Commerce Clause has been especially
important in the context of solid waste, which, as noted, RCRA generally leaves to
the states. In a series of decisions spanning almost twenty years, the U.S. Supreme
Court has repeatedly emphasized that waste disposal is a commercial or economic
activity and thus that, under the dormant Commerce Clause, state and local
governments cannot discriminate against out-of-state waste in their waste disposal
plans.111 These decisions overturned virtually every attempt states made to
105 Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 337–38 (2008) (quoting New Energy Co. of
Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273–74 (1988)).
106 Id. at 338–39 (2008) (citing Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93,
99 (1994)); Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454–55 (1992); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v.
N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624
(1978).
107 Dep’t of Revenue of Ky., 553 U.S. at 338–39 (quoting Or. Waste Sys., Inc., 511 U.S. at 100–01).
108 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
109 Id. at 142 (citations omitted); see also Dep’t of Revenue of Ky., 553 U.S. at 338–39 (reciting this
same test).
110 But see Levy v. Rowland, 359 F. Supp. 2d 267, 273 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (suggesting that the
burdens on interstate commerce caused by Connecticut’s moratorium on transmission of electricity to
New York via high-voltage fiber optic cables outweighed the alleged environmental benefits to
Connecticut citizens of the moratorium).
111 See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 393 (1994) (holding that a
town ordinance that required handling of solid waste at the town’s transfer station violated the dormant
Commerce Clause); Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t. of Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. at 108 (holding that
Oregon violated the dormant Commerce Clause by imposing a $2.50 per ton surcharge on in-state
disposal of waste generated out of the state); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Mich. Dep’t of Nat.
Res., 504 U.S. 353, 367–68 (1992) (holding that a Michigan statute that prohibited private landfill
operators from accepting solid waste that originated outside of the county in which the landfill was
located violated the dormant Commerce Clause); Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334,
346 (1992) (finding that an Alabama statute that imposed an additional fee on all hazardous wastes
generated outside Alabama discriminated against interstate commerce in violation of the Constitution);
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distinguish between in-state and out-of-state waste, despite the burdens—
economic, environmental, and in terms of land use—that importation of another
state’s waste can impose on the receiving state’s landfills and other waste treatment
facilities. Only in 2007, in United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid
Waste Management Authority,112 did the Court give states a constitutional break,
upholding local “flow control” ordinances that directed trash to government-owned
waste processing facilities.113 Thus, somewhat perversely, in a cooperative
federalism scheme designed specifically to encourage state participation, the
dormant Commerce Clause constitutionally limits state creativity.
The dormant Commerce Clause can also limit interstate creativity, as both
Bill Funk and I were exploring almost simultaneously—he in the context of
regional cap-and-trade programs for greenhouse gases,114 I in the context of
multistate agreements and projects related to renewable energy.115 Bill identified
two aspects of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) that could run afoul
of the dormant Commerce Clause: offsets and leakage.116 With regard to offsets,
the RGGI
limits the location of offset projects to participating states or nonparticipating states
whose regulatory agency has entered into a memorandum of understanding to carry
out certain obligations, including auditing and enforcement of offset terms. By
distinguishing between participating states and nonparticipating states, the Model
Rule facially discriminates against interstate commerce in offsets. 117

Hence, it would seem to violate the dormant Commerce Clause. 118 Nevertheless,
“the restriction is not protectionist in intent or effect,” and, pursuant to the Dean
Milk Co. v. City of Madison119 line of cases, “reasonable attempts to provide
equivalent out-of-state safeguards as are provided with respect to in-state entities
are not discriminatory merely because they differ in certain ways or involve an
added cost attributable to the difficulty of out-of-state enforcement.”120
Leakage, in turn, arises “[b]ecause generators within RGGI must have
allowances for their CO2 emissions, which will increase their costs,” incentivizing
them “to import ‘dirty’ electricity rather than pay the higher price for ‘clean’

City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628 (1978) (holding that a New Jersey statute that
prohibited importation of most solid and liquid waste that originated or was collected outside of the state
violated the dormant Commerce Clause). But see Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S.
456, 472 (1981) (upholding a Minnesota statute that banned the retail sale of milk in plastic,
nonreturnable, nonrefillable containers).
112 550 U.S. 330 (2007).
113 Id. at 334.
114 Constitutional Implications of Regional CO2, supra note 7, at 362–69.
115 Robin Kundis Craig, Constitutional Contours for the Design and Implementation of Multistate
Renewable Energy Programs and Projects, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 771, 792–96 (2010).
116 Constitutional Implications of Regional CO2, supra note 7, at 362–64.
117 Id. at 362.
118 Id.
119 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
120 Constitutional Implications of Regional CO2, supra note 7, at 362–63 (citing Dean Milk v. City
of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951)).
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electricity generated within the RGGI area.” 121 One of the potential solutions to the
leakage problem would be to ban electricity generated in non-RGGI states from the
RGGI area,122 but “[t]his facial discrimination would almost surely violate the
Dormant Commerce Clause because it would impose the most extreme burden on
interstate commerce (a ban) in order to achieve the local purpose.” 123 Similarly, a
“hybrid approach would require LSEs to obtain allowances for any power
purchased from outside RGGI . . . [which] would also be facially discriminatory
and could be upheld, if at all, only under the theory underlying the compensatory
tax doctrine.”124
The dormant Commerce Clause also dogs multistate arrangements regarding
renewable energy. “A number of dormant Commerce Clause cases have involved
energy production, and they systematically conclude that states cannot create legal
requirements or preferences based on the source of the fuel or energy.” 125 “Nor can
states ‘hoard’ state-created energy within their borders.”126 As a result,
multistate renewable energy arrangements could implicate the dormant Commerce
Clause in a number of ways. Clearly, at the state level, [Renewable Portfolio
Standard] requirements that favor in-state [Renewable Energy Credits] or forbid outof-state RECs could run afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause. Similarly, multistate
agreements that allow REC trading within the consortium but prohibit RECs from
other states could raise constitutional concerns. Finally, multistate arrangements that
favor—either through RECs, transmission access, or taxes or other financial
incentives—renewable energy produced in certain states and to disfavor renewable
energy produced in others could raise dormant Commerce Clause concerns.127

Thus, Bill Funk and I agree that creative multistate attempts to deal with climate
change and to promote the decarbonization of the United States’ energy supply
could fairly easily run afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause, potentially
thwarting first-best regulatory structures for dealing with this most pressing of
environmental problems.
E. The Compact Clause and Interstate Agreements
If the dormant Commerce Clause can interfere with interstate creativity, the
Compact Clause gives states a constitutional mechanism for pursuing new kinds of
arrangements—so long as they have Congress’s blessing. The U.S. Constitution’s
Interstate Compact Clause provides that:

121

Id. at 363.
See id. at 366.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 366 & n.57 (citing Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937)) (“upholding
Washington State’s use tax on imported goods to compensate for the State’s sales tax against a dormant
commerce clause challenge”).
125 Craig, supra note 115, at 793.
126 Id. at 794.
127 Id. at 795.
122
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No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep
Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with
another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or
in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay. 128

As the italicized language indicates, the Interstate Compact Clause operates as an
explicit restriction on state authority. States entering into any kind of environmental
agreement among themselves need to consider whether Congress’s approval is
necessary, because multistate agreements deemed interstate compacts for purposes
of this clause are unconstitutional without such approval. 129
The U.S. Supreme Court’s first—but still guiding—statement about the
applicability of the Interstate Compact Clause derives from the 1893 case of
Virginia v. Tennessee.130 In this case, Virginia sought to void an 1802–1803
agreement with Tennessee regarding the border between the two states on the
grounds that the agreement was an interstate compact that Congress had not
approved.131 The Court created a legal touchstone that interstate agreements need
Congress’s approval when they “tend[] to the increase of political power in the
States, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United
States.”132 Because states’ agreements regarding borders could encroach “upon the
full and free exercise of Federal authority,” they require Congress’s consent. 133
In contrast, in 1985, the Supreme Court determined that Massachusetts and
Connecticut had not formed an interstate compact when both enacted statutes that
allowed regional but out-of-state bank holding companies to purchase banks and
bank holding companies within each state’s borders.134 Whatever agreement existed
did not infringe upon either federal supremacy or other states’ sovereignty, and
hence Congress’s consent would not be required.135 Similarly, in 2002, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concluded that the Master Settlement
Agreement in the state tobacco litigation, which involved forty-six states and most
of the major tobacco manufacturers, was not an interstate compact requiring
Congress’s approval.136 As the court explained, while “the Master Settlement
Agreement may result in an increase in bargaining power of the States vis-a-vis the
tobacco manufacturers, . . . this increase in power does not interfere with federal
supremacy because the Master Settlement Agreement ‘does not purport to authorize
the member States to exercise any powers they could not exercise in its
absence.’”137 “In addition, the Master Settlement Agreement does not derogate
from the power of the federal government to regulate tobacco,” especially because

128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 27–28 (1951).
148 U.S. 503 (1893).
Id. at 517.
Id. at 519.
Id. at 520.
Ne. Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 175–76 (1985).
See id. at 176.
See Star Sci., Inc. v. Beales, 278 F.3d 339, 345, 360 (4th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 360 (quoting U.S. Steel Corp v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 473 (1978)).
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the Master Settlement Agreement anticipated—and expressly subordinated itself
to—any future federal statutes regulating tobacco.138
In examining the constitutional implications of the RGGI, Bill Funk
concluded that it did not need Congress’s consent as an interstate compact.
Analogizing to the Multi-State Tax Commission at issue in U.S. Steel Corp. v.
Multistate Tax Commission,139 he concluded that:
RGGI does not limit the federal government’s authority to regulate CO2 in any way it
sees fit. Like the Commission, RGGI, Inc.—the entity created to support development
and implementation of the RGGI program—does not impinge on federal supremacy.
No state has delegated its sovereign powers to RGGI, Inc., nor can RGGI, Inc.
exercise any powers over the states. It acts at most in a ministerial and advisory
capacity, much like the Commission. All of RGGI’s actual powers stem solely from
individual states’ laws, which—as was the case under the Compact—are “nothing
more than reciprocal legislation” with no capacity to bind other member states.
This similarity between RGGI and the Compact suggests that RGGI does not
violate the Compact Clause because it lacks congressional consent.140

In contrast, “[m]ost multistate cooperative agreements involving electricity have
proceeded as interstate compacts” and probably need to, given the pervasiveness of
federal regulation in this area.141
However, even when congressionally approved interstate compacts are not
required, congressional approval can confer constitutional benefits on the
compacting states and their created regulatory regime. First, “the existence of an
interstate compact affects the application of the Supremacy Clause and the federal
preemption analysis. Interstate compacts approved by Congress become federal
law, with the result that other federal statutes cannot automatically preempt a
compact.”142 Second, “congressional approval of an interstate compact and its
status as federal law insulates multistate programs from dormant Commerce Clause
scrutiny.”143 As such, a congressionally approved interstate compact represents
cooperative federalism at the multistate level, providing a constitutional mechanism
for interstate creativity to accomplish aims that the U.S. Constitution might not
otherwise allow.

138

Id.
434 U.S. 452, 456–57 (1978); see Constitutional Implications of Regional CO2, supra note 7, at
358–60, for a discussion of the test used to determine when interstate compacts are valid without
Congress’ approval.
140 Constitutional Implications of Regional CO2, supra note 7, at 360. I was less convinced. See
Craig, supra note 115, at 820–22. The courts have not (yet) decided the issue.
141 Craig, supra note 115, at 819 (citing Seattle Master Builders Ass’n v. Pac. Nw. Elec. Power &
Conservation Planning Council, 786 F.2d 1359, 1363–66 (9th Cir. 1986); Safe Harbor Water Power
Corp. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 124 F.2d 800, 806–08 (3rd Cir. 1941)).
142 Id. at 827.
143 Id. at 828–29 (citing Intake Water Co. v. Yellowstone River Compact Comm’n, 769 F.2d 568,
569–70 (9th Cir. 1985)).
139
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III. CITIZEN SUITS AND THE LIMITS OF FEDERAL COURT JURISDICTION
Environmental citizen suit provisions are in some ways Congress’s clearest
statements that the environment is everybody’s business, because Congress allows
private individuals and organizations to help ensure that regulated entities meet
federal environmental requirements. Citizen suits first became important in
connection with NEPA, which imposes duties—most notably the Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS) requirement144—on federal agencies. Because NEPA
apples to federal agencies, private individuals and entities can challenge federal
agency compliance through the federal Administration Procedure Act’s 145 (APA’s)
judicial review provisions.146
Beginning with the CAA in 1970,147 Congress expanded the rights of private
enforcers beyond the APA by including citizen suit provisions in most of the
federal environmental statutes.148 Although these provisions are all similar, the
CWA’s is one of the most typical—and the most used. It provides that:
[A]ny citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf—
(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other
governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the eleventh
amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent
standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an order issued by the Administrator
or a State with respect to such a standard or limitation, or
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to
perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary with the
Administrator.
The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in
controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such an effluent standard or
limitation, or such an order, or to order the Administrator to perform any such act or
duty, as the case may be, and to apply any appropriate civil penalties under section
1319(d) of this title.149

144

42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2012).
5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301, 5335, 5372, 7521 (2012).
146 Id. §§ 701–706.
147 See 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (the CAA’s citizen suit provision).
148 See Hallstrom v. Tillamook Cty., 493 U.S. 20, 23 n.1 (1989) (listing the following statutes as
having similar citizen suit provisions as that in RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (2012): Toxic Substances
Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (2012); ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2012); SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1270
(2012); Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1427 (2012); Deepwater Port Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1515 (2012); Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships, 33 U.S.C. § 1910 (2012); CWA, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365 (2012); Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1415 (2012); Safe
Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j–8 (2012); Noise Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4911 (2012); Energy
Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6305 (2012); Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Act, 42
U.S.C. § 9124 (2012); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (2012); Emergency Planning and Community RightTo-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11046 (2012); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, 43
U.S.C. § 1349 (2012); Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act Amendments of 1976, 49 U.S.C. App. § 60121
(2012)).
149 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2012).
145
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A “citizen” entitled to bring such actions is “a person or persons having an interest
which is or may be adversely affected.” 150 Civil penalties assessed in a citizen suit
are payable to the U.S. Treasury; however, to encourage citizen suits, Congress
made litigation costs, “including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees,”
available to plaintiffs “whenever the court determines such award is
appropriate.”151
Citizen enforcement, it turns out, has significantly added to the effectiveness
of environmental law. As Russell E. Train, the second Administrator of the EPA,
observed, “[c]itizen concern and citizen action were key ingredients both of our
nation’s rapid development of environmental protection policies and of the
effective implementation of those policies.”152 “[M]any established citizen
environmental organizations played an active and effective role, indeed a crucial
one, in monitoring and promoting the enforcement of environmental laws,
especially in the early 1970s during initial implementation of the EIS process in
federal decision making.”153 In 2003, Professor James R. May estimated that
citizens had filed over 2,000 environmental citizen suits since 1970,154 resulting in
about 1,500 reported federal court decisions, which represented at that point
“roughly 3 in 4 (75%) of all reported civil environmental decisions.” 155 Between
1995 and 2002, citizens were responsible for “315 compliance-forcing judicial
consent orders[] under the CWA and CAA alone,” 156 and “[d]uring the same
period, under all environmental statutes, citizens . . . submitted more than 4,500
notices of intent to sue,”157 about eight-ninths of which were directed at members
of the regulated community and the rest directed at implementing agencies. 158
However, citizen suits also raise constitutional issues related to the federal
courts’ jurisdiction to hear environmental lawsuits. For example, because citizen
suit provisions allow private entities to sue governments, federal sovereign
immunity and state Eleventh Amendment immunity become recurring issues.159
Perhaps most importantly, however, environmental citizen suits test federal courts’
Article III jurisdiction over “cases and controversies” and have been the primary
driver of federal court standing jurisprudence since the 1970s.160

150

Id. § 1365(g).
Id. § 1365(d).
152 RUSSELL E. TRAIN, POLITICS, POLLUTION, AND PANDAS: AN ENVIRONMENTAL MEMOIR 94
(2003).
153 Id. at 95.
154 James R. May, Now More Than Ever: Environmental Citizen Suit Trends, 33 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,704, 10,704 (2003).
155 Id. at 10,706.
156 James R. May, Now More Than Ever: Trends in Environmental Citizen Suits at 30, 10 WIDENER
L. REV. 1, 4 (2003).
157 Id.
158 See id.
159 See id. at 4, 11.
160 Id. at 7–8, 33–34.
151
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A. Federal Sovereign Immunity in the Context of Citizen Suits
As is true for state enforcement against federal facilities, when private citizens
attempt to sue federal facilities and federal agencies, ordinary principles of federal
sovereign immunity apply. Most environmental citizen suit provisions allow for at
least some suits against at least some federal entities. Thus, for example, most
citizen suit provisions in the federal pollution control statutes clearly waive the
EPA’s sovereign immunity in suits to compel the Administrator to complete his or
her nondiscretionary duties under the relevant statute. 161 Most environmental
citizen suit provisions also allow lawsuits against federal agencies that violate the
relevant statute.162
The exact wording of an environmental citizen suit provision is critical to the
scope of its waiver of sovereign immunity. For example, despite the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision in U.S. Department of Energy with respect to civil penalties under
the CWA and RCRA, the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Tennessee nevertheless held that citizens could seek civil penalties against federal
facilities under the CAA, distinguishing that statute’s language. 163 The United
States District Court for the Eastern District of California, through somewhat
contorted reasoning, held that although the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ (Army
Corps’ or Corps’) violation of its Incidental Take Statement under the ESA would
not fall within that Act’s citizen suit provision’s waiver of sovereign immunity, the
Corps’ taking of protected fish without Statement protection violated the Act itself
and hence did fall within the waiver of sovereign immunity.164
Sovereign immunity challenges continue to block several kinds of citizen
suits. The CWA’s citizen suit provision, for example, does not mention the Army
Corps, one of the two federal agencies that implement the Act. 165 As a result, the
CWA’s waiver of sovereign immunity does not extend to the Corps, 166 just the
EPA, and it does not allow citizens to seek civil penalties for federal facilities’ past
violations of the Act.167 More generally, compliance with a citizen suit provision’s
procedural requirements are part of the relevant waiver of sovereign immunity, and
hence failure to comply with those requirements in a case against a federal

161 Sierra Club v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 850 F. Supp. 2d 300, 303 (D.D.C. 2012) (CAA); Sierra
Club v. Johnson, 500 F. Supp. 2d 936, 940–41 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (CAA).
162 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (CWA); 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (RCRA); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1)–(2)
(CAA); see also Sierra Club, 850 F. Supp. 2d at 303 (CAA citizen suit against the EPA).
163 United States v. Tenn. Air Pollution Control Bd., 967 F. Supp. 975, 978–82 (M.D. Tenn. 1997).
But see Sierra Club v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 430 F.3d 1337, 1353–56 (11th Cir. 2005); City of
Jacksonville v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, 348 F.3d 1307, 1314–20 (11th Cir. 2003) (both holding that the
CAA did not waive federal sovereign immunity from punitive penalties). Notably, at least one court has
held that the waiver of immunity for environmental suits against the TVA comes from other places.
Tenn. Clean Water Network v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 206 F. Supp. 3d 1280, 1297–98 (M.D. Tenn. 2016).
164 S. Yuba River Citizens League v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 629 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1131–35
(E.D. Cal. 2009).
165 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2012).
166 Cascade Conservation League v. M.A. Segale, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 692, 696–98 (W.D. Wash.
1996); All. to Save the Mattaponi v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5–6 (D.D.C. 2007);
Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 118 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1120 (D. Or. 2000).
167 Sierra Club v. Lujan, 972 F.2d 312, 316 (10th Cir. 1992).
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defendant gives rise to a sovereign immunity defense. 168 In addition, the issue of
whether a federal agency has a nondiscretionary duty or not can be critical to
whether Congress has waived its sovereign immunity from suit.169 As such, federal
sovereign immunity serves to preclude some citizen enforcement of federal
environmental law, limiting full citizen participation in enforcement.
B. State Eleventh Amendment Immunity
As is true in the CWA language quoted in the introduction to this Part, most
environmental citizen suit provisions allow citizen-plaintiffs to sue states for
violations of the federal environmental statutes, so long as such lawsuits are
consistent with the Eleventh Amendment.170 That Amendment provides that “[t]he
Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” 171 On its
face, the Eleventh Amendment only bars suits brought in federal court against a
state by citizens of another state or of a foreign country.172 However, the U.S.
Supreme Court has long interpreted the Eleventh Amendment as also barring suits
in federal court by citizens against their own state.173 However, the Eleventh
Amendment does not bar suits by the federal government against states in federal
court174 (allowing, in the environmental law context, federal enforcement against
states), nor does it address the issue of states’ vulnerability to suit in their own
courts, which is a matter of state sovereign immunity law. 175

168 See Humane Soc’y of the U.S. v. McCarthy, 209 F. Supp. 3d 280, 287–88 (D.D.C. 2016); Envtl.
Integrity Project v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 160 F. Supp. 3d 50, 62 (D.D.C. 2015).
169 Sierra Club v. Wheeler, 330 F. Supp. 3d 407, 417–21 (D.D.C. 2018) (holding that the CAA’s
citizen suit provision does not waive sovereign immunity in lawsuits about discretionary actions);
Friends of the Earth v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 934 F. Supp. 2d 40, 48–49 (D.D.C. 2013) (holding that
the EPA does not have a mandatory duty to make a determination as to whether lead emissions from
general aviation aircraft engines using aviation gasoline endangered the public health or welfare under
the CAA, and hence that the Act does not waive its sovereign immunity from suit); Am. Rd. & Transp.
Builders Ass’n v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 865 F. Supp. 2d 72, 81–82 (D.D.C. 2012) (holding that there
was no waiver of sovereign immunity to review the EPA’s CAA nonroad preemption rules); United
States v. Sensient Colors, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 2d 309, 332 (D.N.J. 2009) (holding that CERCLA’s citizen
suit provision does not waive the EPA’s sovereign immunity if there is no nondiscretionary duty at
issue).
170 See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
171 U.S. CONST., amend. XI.
172 Id.
173 See, e.g., P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144–46 (1993).
174 See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 11 (1989) (citing Employees v. Mo. Dep’t of
Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 285–86 (1973)); United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140–
41 (1965); Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 329 (1934); Equal Emp’t Opportunity
Comm’n v. Bd. of Supervisors for the Univ. of. La. Sys., 559 F.3d 270, 272 (5th Cir. 2009); Chao v. Va.
Dep’t of Transp., 291 F.3d 276, 280 (4th Cir. 2002).
175 E.g., Texas Comm’n on Envtl. Quality v. Bonser-Lain, 438 S.W.3d 887, 892–95 (Tex. Ct. App.
2014) (deciding that the Texas Water Code did not waive the TCEQ’s sovereign immunity regarding
greenhouse gas regulation); Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Commonwealth, Dept. Envtl. Res., 604 A.2d 1177,
1180–81 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992) (concluding that Pennsylvania’s Clean Streams Law waived the
Department’s sovereign immunity).
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The Eleventh Amendment preserves states’ sovereign immunity. 176 However,
because under the U.S. Constitution’s Supremacy Clause federal law can displace
state law, it is sometimes possible for Congress to abrogate states’ Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity. Congress has most clearly exercised this power
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment,177 which was added to the Constitution
after the Civil War. However, in 1996, in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, the
U.S. Supreme Court held that Congress could not abrogate states’ Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity through the Indian Commerce Clause, 178 which
also eliminated abrogation through the Interstate Commerce Clause,179 the basis of
most of the federal environmental statutes. As a result, environmental citizen suits
against states or state agencies in federal court must either find a waiver of
Eleventh Amendment immunity or make use of an exception,180 such as the Ex
parte Young doctrine.181 Otherwise, the suit is barred.182
Like federal sovereign immunity, therefore, Eleventh Amendment immunity
can limit citizen enforcement of the federal environmental statutes. 183 However, it
is also important to remember that citizens may have an alternative option to file an
environmental lawsuit against a state in the state courts,184 an option that does not
exist for citizen suits against the federal government.185
C. Standing
Article III of the U.S. Constitution gives federal courts the power to hear only
“Cases” or “Controversies.” 186 Thus, as a constitutional matter, federal courts are
courts of limited jurisdiction. The standing requirement helps these courts to
comply with this limitation by requiring that the plaintiff have a real and personal
stake in the outcome of the litigation.187 Because standing is a matter of
176

United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. at 140.
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59–60 (1996) (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427
U.S. 445, 455 (1976) (Fourteenth Amendment)).
178 See id. at 72–73.
179 Id.
180 See Mancuso v. N.Y. State Thruway Auth., 86 F.3d 289, 292–97 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that the
N.Y. State Thruway Authority was not a state agency under the “arm of the state” analysis).
181 In Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Eleventh
Amendment permitted suits against state officers, rather than against the state itself, so long as the
plaintiff sought only prospective (injunctive) relief. This exception has applied in several environmental
citizen suits. See, e.g., Cox v. City of Dallas, 256 F.3d 281, 307–09 (5th Cir. 2001) (allowing a RCRA
citizen claim against a state official for injunctive relief).
182 See Burnette v. Carothers, 192 F.3d 52, 56–60 (2d Cir. 1999) (dismissing a CERCLA citizen
suit); Martaugh v. New York, 810 F. Supp. 2d 446, 470 (N.D.N.Y. 2011) (dismissing CWA, RCRA, and
CERCLA claims).
183 Martaugh, 810 F. Supp. 2d at 470.
184 E.g., Boise Cascade Corp. v. State ex rel. Or. State Bd. of Forestry, 991 P.2d 563, 566–70, 573–
74 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (allowing that the State of Oregon could be hauled into state court for ESArelated constitutional takings claims, but holding that this particular claim was not yet ripe).
185 Federal sovereign immunity still applies in state court. E.g., O’Neal v. Dep’t of the Army of the
U.S., 742 A.2d 1095, 1099–1101 (Pa. Super. 1999) (dismissing a CERCLA claim against the United
States on sovereign immunity grounds).
186 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
187 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
177
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constitutional jurisdiction, moreover, failure to meet the standing requirement
results in dismissal of the plaintiff’s suit. 188
The citizen suit provisions in federal environmental statutes and Section 702
of the federal APA potentially allow “random” unrelated third parties with no
direct stake in the litigation—any person or any citizen—to sue federal agencies
and regulated entities for violations of federal environmental laws, raising standing
concerns.189 The U.S. Supreme Court began addressing constitutional
environmental standing in 1972, in Sierra Club v. Morton.190 In that case, it
concluded that the Constitution allowed neither “public interest” standing 191 nor
standing based on the interest of the natural resource itself.192 Instead, the plaintiff
or its members must be directly injured by the action being challenged. 193 The
Court further refined standing jurisprudence in its 1992 decision in Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife,194 articulating the three-element “irreducible constitutional
minimum”195 test that continues to control citizen access to the federal courts.
“First, the plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in fact’—an invasion of a legally
protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized . . . and (b) ‘actual or
imminent, not “conjectural” or “hypothetical”‘ . . . .”196 “Second, there must be a
causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury
has to be ‘fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and
not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the
court.’”197 “Third, it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the
injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’”198
Environmental citizen suits and environmental lawsuits pursuant to the APA
have created a significant and not always wholly reconcilable body of
constitutional environmental law,199 prompting an equally significant body of

188

See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
5 U.S.C. § 702 (1946); 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2012).
190 405 U.S. 727, 734–41 (1972).
191 Id. at 739–40.
192 See id. at 741–44 (Douglas J., dissenting) (arguing in dissent that organizations like the Sierra
Club should be able to speak on behalf of endangered places and resources). Relatedly, species lack
standing to sue in their own right, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dismissed an
Endangered Species Act case because the named plaintiffs—the cetacean community, a group of
whales—lacked standing under both the Endangered Species Act and the APA. Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush,
386 F.3d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004).
193 Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 739.
194 504 U.S. 555, 558 (1992).
195 Id. at 560–61.
196 Id. (quoting and citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756 (1984); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 508 (1975); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740–41, n. 16 (1972); Whitmore v. Arkansas,
495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990) (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983))).
197 Id. (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41–42 (1976)).
198 Id. at 561 (quoting E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. at 38).
199 In just the U.S. Supreme Court, the environmental standing decisions since Sierra Club v.
Morton include: Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 139 S. Ct. 361, 368 n.1 (2018)
(Endangered Species Act); Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 567
U.S. 209, 224–28 (2012) (APA); Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 420 (2011)
(Clean Air Act); Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149–156 (2010) (NEPA);
Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492–501 (2009) (APA challenge to Forest Service
regulations); Massachusetts v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 516–26 (2007) (Clean Air Act);
189
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standing scholarship.200 However, standing jurisprudence also imposes basic
cognitive framings on how the environment can exist within the law. Specifically,
the federal court standing decisions test and articulate the kinds of interests in the
environment that can find voice in the federal courts, which now range from
aesthetic and recreational interests to economic and property interests. 201 Since
Sierra Club v. Morton, however, environmental standing doctrine effectively forces
environmental plaintiffs to frame environmental issues in terms of personal,
concrete, and immediate anthropocentric values, eliding the public interest in and
benefits resulting from basic protection of general ecosystem health and
function.202 Instead, particular environmental amenities must be valuable to a
specific someone who is willing to go to court to protect them. While such persons
are often easy to find, their absence means that public environmental values may
never get their day in court.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL TAKINGS CLAIMS ARISING BECAUSE THE “ENVIRONMENT”
INCLUDES PRIVATE PROPERTY
Federal environmental law is applied administrative law, and, as a result, it
can raise all of the general constitutional issues that all federal administrative
regimes can raise. These include individual constitutional rights and civil liberties,

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–88 (2000) (Clean
Water Act); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 161–66 (1997) (prudential standing under the Endangered
Species Act and APA); Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560–61 (1992) (Endangered Species Act);
Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 882–83 (1990) (APA action about overseas injuries to
species); Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1981)
(Clean Water Act and Marine Protection, Research, & Sanctuaries Act); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451
U.S. 725, 735–39 (1981) (natural gas tax); United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 683–90 (1973) (NEPA).
200 Westlaw calls up well over 2,000 law review articles with “standing” in the title. For a
representative range of environmental standing scholarship, see generally, Alexander Tom, Note,
Standing in a Federal Agency’s Shoes: Should Third-Party Action Affect Redressability under the
National Environmental Policy Act?, 43 ECOLOGY L.Q. 337 (2016); Dru Stevenson & Sonny Eckhart,
Standing as Channeling in the Administrative Age, 53 BOSTON COL. L. REV. 1357 (2012); Christopher
Warshaw & Gregory E. Wannier, Business as Usual? Analyzing the Development of Environmental
Standing Doctrine Since 1976, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 289 (2011); Bradford Mank, Revisiting the
Lyons Den: Summers v. Earth Island Institute’s Misuse of Lyons’s “Realistic Threat” of Harm Standing
Test, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 837 (2010); Bradford Mank, Standing in Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms:
Using Economic Injury as a Basis for Standing When Environmental Harm Is Difficult to Prove, 115
PENN. ST. L. REV. 307 (2010); Oliver A. Houck, Standing on the Wrong Foot: A Case for Equal
Protection, 58 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1 (2007); Robin Kundis Craig, Removing “the Cloak of a Standing
Inquiry”: Pollution Regulation, Public Health, and Private Risk in the Injury-in-Fact Analysis, 29
CARDOZO L. REV. 149 (2007); Randall S. Abate & Michael J. Meyers, Broadening the Scope of
Environmental Standing: Procedural and Informational Injury in Fact After Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 12 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 345 (1994); Jeffery W. Ring & Andrew F. Behrend, Using
Plaintiff Motivation to Limit Standing: An Inappropriate Attempt to Short-Circuit Environmental Citizen
Suits, 8 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 345 (1993); Bruce B. Varney & George J. Ward, Jr., Who Can Stand Up
for the Environment? Standing to Challenge Administrative Agency Actions, 7 ST. JOHNS J. LEGAL
COMMENT 443 (1991); Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for
Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972).
201 See Abate & Myers, supra note 200, at 357–58, 379.
202 Id. at 732, 740.
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especially in the enforcement context. Thus, for example, federal environmental
enforcement has contributed to Fourth Amendment “administrative search”
jurisprudence203 and provided the first prompt to the U.S. Supreme Court to define
the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in the context of federal regulatory
requirements.204
Unlike most federal regulatory regimes, however, environmental law routinely
incorporates private property to fulfill its goals. Private land provides habitat for
endangered and threatened species,205 while water rights can interfere with the
needs of aquatic species, especially in the West during drought. 206 The filling of
wetlands on private land can also eliminate important habitat as well as degrade
water quality.207 Building along the coast may have to be limited in light of coastal
erosion, sea-level rise, and other coastal hazards.208 Water quality protection may
require temporary moratoria on new development to bring runoff under control. 209
As was true for standing jurisprudence, federal environmental law (especially
in combination with environment-related land use law) has provided the occasions
to develop a substantial proportion of federal regulatory takings jurisprudence. 210
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution establishes that the United States
shall not take “private property . . . for public use, without just compensation.”211
This prohibition applies to the state and local governments by way of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 212 For most of U.S. history, the
“takings” clause applied to the government’s physical occupation of real
property.213 In 1922, however, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that governments
could also effect unconstitutional takings of private property through regulation. 214
Under the test that the Court eventually announced, courts evaluating a regulatory

203 See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 229, 234–39 (1986) (upholding the
EPA’s use of aerial photography in CAA enforcement against a Fourth Amendment challenge).
204 Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417–20, 427 (1987) (holding that enforcement actions under
the CWA for penalties require a jury trial).
205 See, e.g., Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1339, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
206 See, e.g., Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
207 See, e.g., Cooley v. United States, 324 F.3d 1297, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
208 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1008–09, 1019 (1992) (holding that when
coastal building restrictions deprive a property owner of all economic use of the property, “there are
good reasons for our frequently expressed belief that when the owner of real property has been called
upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his
property economically idle, he has suffered a taking”).
209 Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 308, 321–24
(2002).
210 Beckett G. Cantley, Environmental Preservation and the Fifth Amendment: The Use and Limits
of Conservation Easements by Regulatory Taking and Eminent Domain, 20 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J.
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 215, 217–18 (2014).
211 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
212 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 383–84 (1994); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 481 n.10 (1987); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,
122 (1978); Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897).
213 Josh Patashnik, Physical Takings, Regulatory Takings, and Water Rights, 51 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 365, 365 (2011) (discussing how traditional takings were seen as a physical appropriation of real
property that carried a “categorical duty to compensate” the landowner).
214 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
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taking claim balance three factors.215 First, “[t]he economic impact of the
regulation on the claimant and, [second], the extent to which the regulation has
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant
considerations.”216 The effect on actual property rights is critical, and no taking
would be found if the plaintiff did not have a cognizable property interest at
stake.217 Finally, the “character of the governmental action” is also important, with
the explanation that “[a] ‘taking’ may more readily be found when the interference
with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government . . . than
when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and
burdens of economic life to promote the common good.” 218 As such, the Court has
generally upheld land use and zoning regulations, 219 but “government actions that
may be characterized as acquisitions of resources to permit or facilitate uniquely
public functions have often been held to constitute ‘takings.’”220
While the regulatory takings doctrine has had a complex history in the U.S.
Supreme Court, it potentially limits any environmental regulatory scheme that can
interfere with private land use.221 Section 404 of the CWA,222 which requires
215 Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124 (discussing factors that are involved in the court’s factbased inquiry on takings).
216 Id. (citing Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)).
217 See id. at 124–25 (citing United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 511 (1945));
United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 60 (1913); Demorest v. City Bank
Co., 321 U.S. 36, 42 (1944); Muhlker v. Harlem R.R. Co., 197 U.S. 544, 552 (1905); Joseph L. Sax,
Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 61 (1964) (discussing the “multitude of existing
interests” associated with property).
218 Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124 (citing United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 270–71
(1946)).
219 Id. at 125–26 (citing Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926); Gorieb v. Fox, 274
U.S. 603, 608 (1927); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909); Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 592–93; Eastlake v.
Forest City Enters., Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 674 n.8 (1976); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928)).
220 Id. at 128.
221 For discussions of regulatory takings in the environmental law context, see John D. Echeverria &
Michael C. Blumm, Horne v. Department of Agriculture: Expanding per se Takings While Endorsing
State Sovereign Ownership of Wildlife, 75 MD. L. REV. 657, 658 (2016) (discussing regulatory takings
in the context of wildlife regulation under the ESA); Richard J. Roddewig & W. James Hughes,
Underbalanced Drilling: Can it Solve the Economic, Environmental and Regulatory Taking Problems
Associated with Fracking?, 49 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 511, 527–28 (2015) (discussing the controversial
regulations on land use for fracking); Cantley, supra note 210, at 223; Robin Kundis Craig, Using a
Public Health Perspective to Insulate Land-Use Related Coastal Climate Change Adaptation Measures
from Constitutional Takings Challenges, 66 PLAN. & ENVTL. L. 4, 4 (2014) (discussing a 2010 U.S.
Supreme Court decision which held that a Florida beach project did not amount to an unconstitutional
regulatory taking); Richard A. Epstein, Physical and Regulatory Takings: One Distinction Too Many, 64
STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 99, 101 (2012) (discussing the various levels of protection against government
activity that are given to differing land uses); Robin Kundis Craig, Defining Riparian Rights as
“Property” Through Takings Litigation: Is There a Property Right to Environmental Quality?, 42
ENVTL. L. 115, 131–32 (2012) (discussing environmental regulation’s impacts on riparian rights);
Patashnik, supra note 213, at 366 (discussing the importance of the Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council U.S.
Supreme Court decision in takings jurisprudence); Michael C. Blumm & J.B. Ruhl, Background
Principles, Takings, and Libertarian Property: A Response to Professor Huffman, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q.
805, 816–19 (2010) (providing insight into background principles used in takings analyses); James L.
Huffman, Background Principles and the Rule of Law: Fifteen Years after Lucas, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1,
4–5 (2008); James L. Huffman, Beware of Greens in Praise of the Common Law, 58 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 813, 816 (2008) (discussing environmental regulatory takings in light of recent U.S. Supreme
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permits when people dredge or fill waters on private property, 223 and the ESA’s
critical habitat224 and species take prohibitions225 have been particularly productive
at generating constitutional takings cases.226
Regulatory takings claims nevertheless remain difficult to prove, and in the
environmental law context the courts have articulated several ameliorating
principles of law. For example, “[o]nly when a permit is denied and the effect of
the denial is to prevent ‘economically viable’ use of the land in question can it be
said that a taking has occurred.”227 Under this rule, the Army Corps’ designation of
property as wetlands subject to CWA regulation does not constitute a “taking,”
regardless of whether the designation immediately affects the property’s value. 228
In addition, the courts apply a “whole parcel” rule, under which they evaluate loss
of value against the entire legal parcel at issue, not just the part where development

Court precedent); Hannah Jacobs Wiseman, Partial Regulatory Takings: Stifling Community
Participation Under the Guise of Kelo Reform, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 60 (2007) (discussing
government interference of property in the Kelo U.S. Supreme Court decision); Michael C. Blumm &
Lucus Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background Principles as Categorical Takings
Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321, 322 (2005) (discussing the importance of the Lucas decision in
regulatory takings jurisprudence); Steven J. Eagle, Regulatory Takings, Public Use, and Just
Compensation After Brown, 33 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,807 (2003); J. David Breemer, Of
Nominal Value: The Impact of Tahoe-Sierra on Lucas and the Fundamental Right to Use Private
Property, 33 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,331 (2003); Michael C. Blumm, Palazzolo and the
Decline of Justice Scalia’s Categorical Takings Doctrine, 30 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 137 139–40
(2002); David K. Brooks, Regulatory Takings—Where Environmental Protection and Private Property
Collide, 17 NAT. RESOURCES & ENVT. 10, 10 (2002); Courtney Harrington, Penn Central to Palazzolo:
Regulatory Takings Decisions and Their Implications for the Future of Environmental Regulation, 15
TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 383 384–86 (2002); Nicholas J. Johnson, Regulatory Takings and Environmental
Regulatory Evolution: Toward a Macro Perspective, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 557, 558–59 (1995);
James L. Huffman, A Coherent Takings Theory at Last: Comments on Richard Epstein’s “Takings:
Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain”, 17 ENVTL. L. 153 (1986).
222 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2012).
223 Id.
224 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3) (2012).
225 Id. § 1538(a).
226 For § 404 of the CWA, see generally for example Cooley v. United States, 324 F.3d 1297, 1299–
1300 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Res. Invs., Inc. v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 447, 455, 457 (2009); Norman v.
United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 231, 233 (2004); Pax Christi Mem’l Gardens, Inc. v. United States, 52 Fed.
Cl. 318, 319 (2002); Formanek v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 785, 786 (1989). For the ESA, see generally
for example Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276, 1279–82 (Fed. Cir. 2008);
Gordon v. Norton, 322 F.3d 1213, 2015 (10th Cir. 2003); Boise Cascade Corp., 296 F.3d at 1341;
Ideker Farms, Inc. v. United States, 136 Fed. Cl. 654, 659, 666 (2018); Klamath Irrigation v. United
States, 129 Fed. Cl. 722, 724–25 (2016); Doyle v. United States, 129 Fed. Cl. 147, 149 (2016).
227 United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 127 (1985); see also Cooley, 324
F.3d at 1301–04 (holding that a taking claim was ripe if the Corps issued a final permit decision, even if
the Corps later reconsidered that decision); Rybachek v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 904 F.2d 1276, 1300
(9th Cir. 1990) (holding that a “takings” claim was not ripe when EPA had not yet applied its
regulations to the parcel in question); Moore v. United States, 943 F. Supp. 603, 611–12 (E.D. Va. 1996)
(holding that a “takings” claim was not ripe until there was a permit denial); United States v. Robinson,
570 F. Supp. 1157, 1166 (M.D. Fla. 1983) (“As defendants have never had a permit denied, their taking
claim is not ripe for judicial relief.” (citing United States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204, 1211 (7th Cir. 1979));
see Robert Meltz, Wetlands Regulation and the Law of Regulatory Taking, 30 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl.
Law Inst.) 10468 (Jun. 2000).
228 Robbins v. United States, 40 Fed. Cl. 381, 385–86 (1998).
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cannot occur.229 Relatedly, mere diminution in value is not enough to prove a
regulatory taking.230 Finally, the existence of a federal regulatory scheme prior to
purchase is relevant in evaluating the reasonableness of the property owner’s
investment-backed expectations.231
As a matter of adjudicated reality, the Takings Clauses have imposed only
limited checks on environmental law. Takings jurisprudence, however, creates
hesitations in governments contemplating new regulation—an unwillingness to
exercise their full constitutional authority with respect to private property out of
fear of expensive litigation, public backlash, or both. For example, only two states
have taken on section 404 permitting authority under the CWA, in part because of
the fears of takings liability from regulating the dredging and filling of wetlands
and other waters232—activities generally associated with construction.
Jurisprudential complexity (one might even say confusion) in specific subsets of
takings cases, such as permit conditions/exactions or water rights, only increase the
regulatory hesitation. While the “proper” balance between private rights and public
needs is of course always subject to debate, the regulatory takings doctrine has
contributed disproportionately to constitutional environmental law compared to its
actual legal impact.
V. CONCLUSION: WILL THERE BE A FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
RIGHT?
Despite the breadth and pervasiveness of constitutional environmental law, the
U.S. Constitution itself provides no environmental rights.233 Indeed, it does not
even mention the environment. Moreover, although many other countries have
found a penumbral constitutional environmental right in various constitutional
protections such as the right to life, 234 the history of constitutional environmental

229 Forest Props., Inc. v. United States, 177 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also Formanek, 18
Cl. Ct. at 794–95 (holding that the “taking” claim applied to the whole parcel when the Corps
recognized throughout the permitting process that the plaintiff’s development project involved the entire
parcel, not just the wetlands). But see Fla. Rock Indus. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 160, 164–65 (1985),
aff’d, 791 F.2d 893, 904–05 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1053 (1987) (holding that the
relevant property for the “taking” analysis was the nighty-eight acres out of 1,560 acres involved in the
permit denial, even though the claimant eventually intended to mine the whole property).
230 See Jentgen v. United States, 657 F.2d 1210, 1213–14 (Fed. Cir. 1981); Deltona Corp. v. United
States, 657 F.2d 1184, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 1017 (1982); 1902 Atl. Ltd. v.
Hudson, 574 F. Supp. 1381, 1404–05 (E.D. Va. 1983); Walcek v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 248, 267,
272 (finding no “taking” despite a 59.8% diminution in value); Robinson, 570 F. Supp. at 1166 (citing
Deltona Corp., 657 F.2d at 1193).
231 E.g., Broadwater Farms Joint Venture v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 154, 156–57 (1999); Brace v.
United States, 48 Fed. Cl. 272, 282–83 (2000) (both holding that the claimant’s investment-backed
expectations were mitigated by his being on notice of the CWA’s requirements).
232 State or Tribal Assumption of the Section 404 Permit Program, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, https://perma.cc/89F9-HJD8 (last visited July 13, 2019).
233 Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 130 F.3d 1041, 1065–66 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
234 Robin Kundis Craig, Should There Be a Constitutional Right to a Clean/Healthy Environment?,
34 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 11,013, 11,018 (2004).
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jurisprudence in the United States stands squarely against the finding of such a
right within the U.S. Constitution.235
First, federal judges emphasize the U.S. Constitution’s failure to mention the
environment whenever plaintiffs have suggested that the federal courts should
recognize a penumbral constitutional right to a clean and healthy environment, 236
which plaintiffs have done since at least 1971 through a variety of strategies. 237
Second, decades of attempts to extend the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights
to life,238 the Ninth Amendment protection of other fundamental rights, 239 Fifth240
and Fourteenth241 Amendment Due Process, and Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
Equal Protection242 to the environment had—at least until 2016243—universally
failed. In 1971, for example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
dismissively refused to recognize a constitutional right to environmental protection
to reinforce the newly enacted NEPA, concluding that “[w]hile a growing number
of commentators argue in support of a constitutional protection for the
environment, this newly-advanced constitutional doctrine has not yet been
accorded judicial sanction; and appellants do not present a convincing case for
doing so.”244 Over two decades later, and despite dozens of intervening cases, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit could with even more
assurance conclude that citizens of the United States do not “have a fundamental
235 I first discussed the issue of a constitutional right to a clean and healthy environment in 2003 and
2004. ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, THE CLEAN WATER ACT AND THE CONSTITUTION: LEGAL STRUCTURE
AND THE PUBLIC’S RIGHT TO A CLEAN AND HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT 238–259 (2004); see Craig, supra
note 234, at 11,013, 11,018. The discussion here both updates and recasts that earlier work.
236 See, e.g., National Ass’n of Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1065 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
Commerce Clause empowers Congress ‘to regulate commerce’ not ‘ecosystems.’ The Framers of the
Constitution extended that power to Congress, concededly without knowing the word ‘ecosystems,’ but
certainly knowing as much about the dependence of humans on other species and each of them on the
land as any ecologist today. An ecosystem is an ecosystem, and commerce is commerce.”).
237 Craig, supra note 234, at 11,020–21.
238 See Gasper v. La. Stadium & Exposition Dist., 577 F.2d 897, 898–99 (5th Cir. 1978); In re
“Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 475 F. Supp. 928, 933–34 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); Fed. Emps. for NonSmokers’ Rights v. United States, 446 F. Supp. 181, 184–85 (D.D.C. 1978); Gasper v. La. Stadium &
Exposition Dist., 418 F. Supp. 716, 718–21 (E.D. La. 1976).
239 Concerned Citizens of Neb. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 970 F.2d 421, 426–27 (8th Cir.
1992); In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 475 F. Supp. at 933–34; Gasper, 418 F. Supp. at 721–
22; Pinkney v. Ohio Envtl. Prot. Agency, 375 F. Supp. 305, 309–10 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Hagedorn v.
Union Carbide Corp., 363 F. Supp. 1061, 1064–65 (N.D. W. Va. 1973); James River & Kanawha Canal
Parks, Inc. v. Richmond Metro. Auth., 359 F. Supp. 611, 640–41 (E.D. Va. 1973); Tanner v. Armco
Steel Corp., 340 F. Supp. 532, 535 (S.D. Tex. 1972); Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng’rs of U.S.
Army, 325 F. Supp. 728, 739 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
240 In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 475 F. Supp. at 933–34; Union Carbide Corp., 363 F.
Supp. at 1064–65; Richmond Metro. Auth., 359 F. Supp. at 640–41; Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc., 325 F. Supp.
at 739.
241 Valero Terrestrial Corp. v. McCoy, 36 F. Supp. 2d 724, 752–53 (N.D. W. Va. 1997);
MacNamara v. Cty. Council of Sussex Cty., 738 F. Supp. 134, 142 (D. Del. 1990); In re “Agent
Orange” Product Liability Litigation, 475 F. Supp. at 933–34; Pinkney, 375 F. Supp. at 310–11; Union
Carbide, 363 F. Supp. at 1064–65; Richmond Metro. Auth., 359 F. Supp. at 640–41; Tanner, 340 F.
Supp. at 535–37; Envtl. Def. Fund, 325 F. Supp. at 739.
242 Concerned Citizens of Neb., 970 F.2d at 427; Stop H-3 Ass’n v. Dole, 870 F.2d 1419, 1429–30
(9th Cir. 1989).
243 Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1271–72 (D. Or. 2016).
244 Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1139 (4th Cir. 1971).
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right to an environment free of non-natural radiation.”245 Most recently, the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia and the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit have made clear that constitutional
environmental rights arising under state constitutions do not create rights under the
U.S. Constitution.246
Despite this legal wall of decisions that federal constitutional environmental
rights do not exist, in 2016 the United States District Court for the District of
Oregon held in Juliana v. United States that there is a fundamental due process
right to a stable climate system, because “a stable climate system is a necessary
condition to exercising other rights to life, liberty, and property.” 247 The court was
careful to limit this newfound constitutional environmental right:
In framing the fundamental right at issue as the right to a climate system capable of
sustaining human life, I intend to strike a balance and to provide some protection
against the constitutionalization of all environmental claims. On the one hand, the
phrase “capable of sustaining human life” should not be read to require a plaintiff to
allege that governmental action will result in the extinction of humans as a species.
On the other hand, acknowledgment of this fundamental right does not transform any
minor or even moderate act that contributes to the warming of the planet into a
constitutional violation. In this opinion, this Court simply holds that where a
complaint alleges governmental action is affirmatively and substantially damaging the
climate system in a way that will cause human deaths, shorten human lifespans, result
in widespread damage to property, threaten human food sources, and dramatically
alter the planet’s ecosystem, it states a claim for a due process violation, To hold
otherwise would be to say that the Constitution affords no protection against a
government’s knowing decision to poison the air its citizens breathe or the water its
citizens drink. Plaintiffs have adequately alleged infringement of a fundamental
right.248

Nevertheless, and despite the fact that the district court was deciding only a motion
to dismiss, the Juliana decision has been subject to three years of legal
maneuvering, with the net result that the district court’s initial legal decisions are
now on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.249 After
the District of Oregon denied the government’s motion for interlocutory appeal in
June 2017,250 the federal government sought mandamus orders to dismiss twice
from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 251 and once from the U.S.
Supreme Court,252 only to be denied in all three instances. 253 In October 2018, the
245

Concerned Citizens of Neb., 970 F.2d at 426.
Del. Riverkeeper Network v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 243 F. Supp. 3d 141, 152–53
(D.D.C. 2017) (holding that environmental rights created under the Pennsylvania Constitution do not
create federal due process rights), aff’d, 895 F.3d 102, 108–10 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
247 See Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1250.
248 Id.
249 Juliana v. United States, No. 6:15-cv-01517-AA, 2018 WL 6303774, at *3 (D. Or. Nov. 21,
2018).
250 Id. at *2.
251 In re United States, 884 F.3d 830, 837–38 (9th Cir. 2018); In re United States, 895 F.3d 1101,
1106 (9th Cir. 2018).
252 United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Or., 139 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2018).
253 Id.; In re United States, 884 F.3d at 837–38; In re United States, 895 F.3d at 1106.
246
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Oregon District Court agreed to dismiss the President as a defendant and concluded
that material issues of fact precluded summary judgment on standing; however, it
refused to reconsider separation of powers issues and concluded that strict scrutiny
would apply to the due process claim. 254 The court again refused to certify its
decision for an interlocutory appeal.255 In response to this new decision, the United
States again appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which first stayed the case 256 and
then vacated its own order three weeks later.257 The Ninth Circuit then stepped in
and stayed the case, inviting the Oregon District Court to revisit its decisions
regarding an interlocutory appeal, and the district court certified the appeal.258 Oral
argument in the Ninth Circuit took place on June 4, 2019.259
One can only conclude from these procedural shenanigans and the federal
government’s clear unwillingness to let the normal trial and appeal processes play
themselves out that the prospect of fundamental constitutional rights in the
environment terrifies the Trump Administration—even though the Juliana case
might well fail Article III standing. Juliana may well open a new chapter in
constitutional environmental law. Even if it does not, however, constitutional
environmental law will continue to generate litigation and scholarship for the
foreseeable future, helping to articulate the constitutional relationships between and
among the federal and state governments and their citizens.

254 Juliana, 339 F. Supp. 3d 1062, 1076–80, 1084–96 (D. Or. 2018) (dismissing the President as a
defendant, refusing to reconsider the separation of powers issues, and precluding summary judgment on
the standing issue).
255 Id. at 1104–05.
256 In re United States, 139 S. Ct. 16, 16 (2018).
257 In re United States, 139 S. Ct. 452, 453 (2018).
258 Juliana, No. 6:15-cv-01517-AA, 2018 WL 6303774, at *3 (D. Or. Nov. 21, 2018) (referencing
United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Or., Case No. 18-73014, Order Dated Nov. 8, 2018 (9th
Cir. 2018)).
259 Unusually, the oral argument was recorded and the broadcast and can be viewed here:
https://perma.cc/QZ29-UX7X.
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